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igio: James Dugdale Baird, of Carthage, Ill.; Arthur Milton
Comley, of Bridgeport, Conn.; Eldon Lewis Hilditch, of Thomp-
sonville, Conn. ;Thomas Connelly Malley, of Springfield, Mass.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS.
In the case of The People v. The Rochester Railway and Light
Company 41 N. Y. Law J. No. 6, it was held, that a corporation
is not, under the Penal Code, indictable for manslaughter in the
second degree. The provisions of the Code defining homicide and
manslaughter as the killing of one human being by another, do
not include corporations. Sects. 179, i8o, etc. The Rochester
Railway and Light Company had been indicted for the crime of
manslaughter in the second degree, because it, per allegations, in-
stalled in a residence certain apparatus so negligently that gases
escaping therefrom caused the death of an inmate. Upon a de-
murrer to the indictment the question of whether a corporation
may be indicted under Section 193 of the Penal Code arose. The
court could not discover any evidence of an intent upon the part
of the legislature to abandon the limitations of its enactments to
human beings or to include a corporation as a criminal. In reach-
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ing this conclusion, however, interpreting a specific provision of the
Code, the court briefly considered the general question, whether
a corporation is capable of committing in any form such a crime
as that of manslaughter.
And in the first place, were it not for the fact that it appears
to have partaken of Phoenix-like qualities, it would doubtless be
wearisome to the reader to again state that although Lord Chief
Justice Holt is said to have held that, "A corporation is not in-
dictable, although the particular members of it are." Anon., 12
Mod. 559, that in modern times this doctrine, if it were ever
promulgated,* has absolutely no stand in courts or among text
writers. Since a corporation, "is an artificial being, invisible, in-
tangible and existing only in contemplation of law, it must act
by its officers and agents, and their purposes, motives and intent
are just as much those of the corporation as are the things done.
Although, from the very nature of its existence, a corporation
cannot be imprisoned bodily, yet it may be fined, and the fine
may be enforced against its property, or its charter may be for-
feited because of some nonfeasance or malfeasance or mis-
feasance, the fear of which forfeiture could certainly be made as
strong a deterrent force with a corporation, as is imprisonment
with the average individual.
There is, doubtless, no principle of corporation law better set-
tled to-day than the one that a corporation may be indicted and
fined for offenses consisting merely of nonfeasance. In quite
a number of the early cases a distinction was made between the
criminal responsibility for a nonfeasance and for responsibilities
for a misfeasance. While it was conceded that an indictment
would lie for the one, it was held that it would not lie for the
other. Cont. v. Swift Run Gap Turnpike Co., 2 Va. Cas. 363.
Such holdings, however, have not been approved, and the prin-
ciple is now well established that a corporation may be indicted
for a misfeasance or malfeasance as well as for a nonfeasance.
Reg. v. Great North of England Ry. Co.,. 9 Q. B., A. & C., 315.
Lord Denman, C. J., when it was urged in behalf of corpora-
tions that it was unnecessary to hold them criminally liable for
acts of misfeasance, since their officers who do the act may be
indicted, said: "Of this there is no doubt. But the public know
nothing of the former, and the latter, if they can be identified,
are commonly persons of the lowest rank, wholly incompetent to
make any reparation for the injury." Reg. v. Railway, supra.
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In the same case appears a dictum to the effect that a corporation
cannot be guilty of an offense which involves the element of
malice or evil intent; but this broad statement may well be ques-
tioned. It is a settled principle that a corporation may be held
liable in a civil action for wrongs of its officers and agents in-
volving the element of malice, and that it may be subjected to
exemplary or punitive damages, and the assertion that an indict-
ment for offenses which derive their criminality from evil intent
is open to question. State v. Passaic County Agricultural Soc., 54
N. J. L. 26o. Malice is an element of criminal libel, and an in-
dictment against a corporation for the same has been sustained.
State v. Atchison, 3 Lea. Tenn., 729. It has also been held that
a corporation is indictable for a criminal contempt of court, al-
though a criminal contempt involves a specific intent as a nec-
essary element. The contempt in question was publishing an
article in a newspaper, concerning a pending trial, which was
deemed to prejudice the jury, and thus tend to prevent a fair
trial. Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Com., 172 Mass., 294. There
are many dicta to the effect that a corporation cannot be guilty
of an offense involving the element of personal violence, as
assault and battery, riots, etc., Reg. v. Railway, supra, and there
appears to be no reported case to the effect that an indictment
has ever been maintained for such crimes.
In the recent case of The New York Central and Hudson River
Railroad Company v. United States, Vol. 212, No. 5 U. S. Rep.,
April 5, I9°9, wherein an indictment against the railway com-
pany and one of its agents for giving rebates was sustained, it
was held that "due process of law is not denied by the provi-
sions of the Elkins Act of February 19, 1903, 32 Stat. at L.
847, under which the commission, by corporate officers, acting
within the scope of their employment, of criminal violations of
the prohibitions of that act against giving rebates, is imputed to
tie corporation, and the corporation is subject to criminal prose-
cution therefor." Furthermore, a joinder of both, the agents
and the corporation in the indictment, was allowed. At the
same time the court held that there are some crimes which, from
their very nature, cannot be committed by corporations.
The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Rochester Rail-
way and Light Company, supra, in a dictun hold: "We have
no doubt that a definition of certain forms of manslaughter
might have been formulated, which would be applicable to a
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corporation, and make it criminally liable for various acts of
misfeasance and nonfeasance when resulting in homicide, and
among which, very probably, might be included conduct in its
substance similar to that here, vide supra, charged against the
respondent." The court then goes on to plainly show under the
existing law that the defendant cannot be held. However, this
dictum shows the state of sentiment today in regard to holding
corporations criminally responsible for a set of crimes for which,
thus far in the development of the law, they have not been held,
although Massachusetts and some of the other New England
states at one time, by statute, allowed an indictment to hold in
cases of manslaughter, the fine being given to the widow or next
of kin. These laws were in effect merely an effective civil aid,
rather than a criminal indictment. The civil liability of corpor-
ations has had a steady growth, analagous, though limited, to
the criminal, and especially is this true in connection with the
growth of tort liability.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case bf U. S. v.
Railway Co., supra, says: "It is a part of the public history of
the times that statutes against rebates could not be effectually
enforced so long as individuls only were subject to punishment
for violations of the law, when the giving of rebates as conces-
sions inured to the benefit of the corporations, of which the
individuals were but the instruments ....... .We see no valid
objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the
corporation, which profits by the transaction, and can only act
through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable by fine
because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to whom it
has entrusted authority to act in the subject matter of making
and fixing rates of transportation, and whose knowledge and
purposes may well be attributed to the corporation for which the
agents act."
That the law in connection with the subject of the indictability
of corporations is a live, healthy, growing organism, there can be
little doubt. Not so very long ago, corporations, from the very
fact that they were so few in number, held certain immunities, not
held today. These immunities existed not so much from the
nature of the corporation as "a soulless creature," and similar
attributes more tritely than truly put, as from the fact that it was
not so vital a question, while corporations were so few in num-
bers and small in power, to thresh out each minute doctrine re-
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suiting from a reductio ad absurdum of the intangible entity
theory. The whole growth of the modern law is to take away
as much as is possible of fiction, and the doctrine of criminal
liability of corporations does not appear to be forming any
privileged exception. Our Supreme Court well moulded into
words both the spirit of the modern law and the spirit of the
times when it said: "There can be no question of the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce to prevent favoritism,
and to secure equal rights to all engaged in interstate trade. It
would be a distinct step backward to hold that Congress cannot
control those who are conducting this interstate commerce by
holding them responsible for the intent and purposes of the
agents to whom they have delegated the power to act in the
premises." N. Y. C. & H. Ry Co. v. U. S., supra.
REGULATION OF CONTRACTS UNDER THE POLICE POWER.
With the formal entrance of the American Federation of
Labor into the field of national politics last summer, it became
evident that we are destined to have in this country a large body
of voters clamoring for laws to advance their own class interests.
To what extent our legislators will yield to the persistent de-
mands of labor leaders, it is impossible to determine; but it is
almost certain that from time to time waves of radicalism will
sweep over the country and carry with them statutes which, if
undisturbed, will work-much harm and little good to our nation.
When, in addition to this, we consider the present optimism of a
large number of our lawmakers, who by legislative fiat hope to
cure many almost inherent human vices, we realize that the Con-
stitution of the United States grows constantly more important
as a protection of individual rights and liberties against unjust
and arbitrary enactments.
The protection of the public against encroachment on their
privileges by legislation is secured by that part of the fourteenth
amendment which declares: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law." This
restriction on the power of the states is, however, limited by the
fact that both property and liberty are held on such reasonable
conditions as may be imposed by the State in the exercise of the
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police power. Mugler v. Kan., 123 U. S. 623. Thus, in every
case where the protection of-the Federal Constitution is sought
against harsh legislation, the question arises: Is this a fair, rea-
sonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power or is it an
unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the
rights of the individual? In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624.
A few attempts have been made to define police power, but
most courts have declared it incapable of exact definition, and
have held with Mr. Chief Justice Shaw that, "It is much easier
to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power
than to mark its boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise."
Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cushing 84. As a result it has come
about that the extent of police power rests largely with the
courts, and what is thought without the power at one time may
be permanently included within it at another. On almost no
subject are the courts of this country in greater conflict than as
to the scope of this power, and there is little likelihood of any
uniform legislation. To what degree and over what subjects the
Supreme Court of the United States extends the police power is,
therefore, of vital importance to the community, as such inter-
pretation greatly limits the protection of the individual against
oppressive State legislation.
In the recent case of McClean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, the
United States Supreme Court has rendered an opinion which is
important as showing the length to which states may go under
the police power in the regulation of the contracts of private
parties. That the general right to make contracts is protected by
the fourteenth amendment, has been thoroughly established in
the courts. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578. The Supreme
Court, in the case under consideration, upheld the power of the
Arkansas legislature to pass an act which, in substance, declared
that every mine operator or mining company employing more
than twelve men, and paying his employees at a ton or bushel
weight, should weigh or measure all the coal coming out of the
mine before it has been screened, and base the wages paid on the
amount of unscreened coal. For any mine owner to contract to
pay his men for screened coal was declared a serious offence,
involving fines or imprisonment or both.
This law constituted, as may be seen, a serious curtailment of
the right to contract and could, therefore, only be supported in
case it came within the police power of the state. In sustaining
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the act the Supreme Court took the ground that, as it was unable
to say that the law had no reasonable relation to the protection
of a large class of laborers and did not promote harmonious re-
lations between capital and labor, the law was within the power
of the state. A different course was taken from that adopted
in the cases deciding on the validity of laws limiting the hours
of certain employments and the reasonableness of the statute
was hardly considered. Instead, after briefly touching upon the
claims of the advocates of such a law, the court declared:' "It
is not for us to say vhether these are the actual conditions. It
is sufficient to say that it was a situation brought to the atten-
tion of the legislature, concerning which it was entitled to act
and judge for itself in the exercise of its lawful power to pass
remedial legislation."
The advisability of such a method of payment has been, in-
deed, seriously questioned by both laborers as well as capitalists.
In bituminous mining the miners have generally urged such a
law and it was undoubtedly their political influence which was
responsible for this Arkansas statute. At the same time it has
been urged by many students of the problem that such legisla-
tion militates against the best interests of the industry. Thus
Judge English, of the West Virginia Court, said in a dissenting
opinion: "What then are the inevitable results of the law under
consideration? It depresses the wages of the miners; it takes
bread from the family of the skilled miners and gives it to the
family of the unskilled and careless one. When this act is en-
forced there is no longer any incentive to the skilled miner to
send out as the product of his labor the highest percentage of
merchantable coal." State v. Coal Co., 36 W. Va., 802. In the
anthracite the demand for such a method of payment was once
popular, but the present, more competent organization of the
United Mine Workers holds such a change as undesirable for
labor. Both mine owners and mine workers dispute to a great
extent the advantage of such a law, both in its effect on them-
selves and on the industry. In this lies the distinction between
the present decision and the ordinary opinions as to police power
since the beneficiality to at least a large class by the enactment of
laws compelling vaccination, or ordering the destruction of
spoiled food, or limiting the hours for women's work, or similar
statutes cannot be denied.
In four states coal screening laws of the same general nature
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as this Arkansas statute have been passed on by the courts. West
Virginia and Arkansas have upheld the laws, while Illinois and
Colorado have condemned them as unconstitutional. The case
of the State v. Peel Splint Coal Company, 36 W. Va. 802, is the
most important decision upholding such an act. The West Vir-
ginia court based its opinion first upon the ground that the coal
mining company was a corporation in the enjoyment of extraor-
dinary privileges, and, second, that such companies in that State
are required to take out a license, and, therefore, become li-
censees. In ifs decision the court followed Munn v. Illinois, 94
U. S. 113, where the validity of legislation fixing grain elevator
charges was sustained. It is very difficult to see upon what
theory such an extension of the doctrine of that cabe was made.
The principle of Munn v. Illinois was based upon the statement
of Lord Chief Justice Hale, made more than 200 years before,
in which he said, when property is "affected with public interest
it ceases to be juri privati only." De Juri Maris, i Harg. Law
Tracts 6. This ground of the decision as the only one in which
it could be sustained was later affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 53. That the principle applied to
carriers, hack drivers, and similar occupations has not been ques-
tioned, because of the nature of their pursuits, but its extension
to coal mines has rarely been ever suggested. It was not raised
in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, where the constitutionality of
an eight-hour law for miners was sustained, and it seems incredi-
ble to believe that the United States Supreme Court would even
consider a law fixing the selling price for coal, which statute
might well be constitutional if the words, !'affected with public
interest,' are to be so broadly construed. Such a claim was de-
cisively repudiated in Millet v. Illinois, 117 Ill., 294.
In State v. Wilson, 61 Kans. 35, the Kansas statute sustaining
such a coal screening law was sustained, but here the court said:
"In our judgment the law in no wise affects the right of contract,
and does not hinder or prevent the mine operator or miners from
making such agreements as they may choose concerning the
amount of compensation to be paid for labor in mining coal. Nor
does the act prohibit the employment of miners at day wages or
make void contracts for the payment of wages based on the
quantity of screened coal produced." The effect of this Kansas
law was not the same as that of the Arkansas law, where payment
by screening was made illegal.
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The Colorado and Illinois courts are most emphatic in holding
such screening acts repugnant to the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment. In Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill., 380, the Illinois
court says: "In all other kinds of business involving the employ-
ment of labor, the employer and employee are left free to fix
by contract the amount of wages to be paid, and the mode in
which such wages shall be ascertained and computed. This is
justly regarded as a very important right, vitally affecting the
interests of both parties. To the extent to which it is abridged, a
property right is taken away. There is nothing in the business
of coal mining which renders either the employer or employee less
capable of contracting in respect to wages than in any of the
branches of business in which laborers are employed under
analogous circumstances." The Colorado Court charcaterized such
an act as an "infringement of personal guarantees." Re House
Bill No. 203, 21 Col. 27.
Five cases stand out prominently among the Supreme Court
decisions as passing upon the constitutionality of laws restricting
the right of contract. Two of these opinions are concerned with
laws regulating the payment of wages, and the other three deal
with statutes fixing the maximum number of hours in cer-
tain occupations. In Patterson v. The Eudora, i9o U. S., i69,
the court sustained an act of Congress making it a misdemeanor
for a shipmaster to pay a sailor any part of his wages in advance.
The court took notice of the conditions of the sailors' livelihood,
and largely based its decision on the necessity of such a law to
protect seafaring men against unscrupulous masters. During
the year before this case was decided the Supreme Court in
Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, upheld the constitu-
tionality of a statute requiring the redemption in cash of store
orders or other evidences of indebtedness issued by employers in
payment of wages upon the ground that the employee was at a
disadvantage in dealing with the employer about such matters.
Of the other class of cases was Holden v. Hardy, i69 U. S.,
366, where the Supreme Court held an eight-hour law affecting
mine workers constitutional because of the nature of the employ-
ment. This ruling was not followed in Lochner v. New York,
198 U. S., 45, where a statute limiting the working hours of
bakers was held unconstitutional, the conditions of the trade
being carefully distinguished from mining. Following out this
principle, the Supreme Court in Muller v. Oregon, 2o8 U. S. 412,
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upheld an Oregon statute prohibiting the working of females in
laundries more than ten hours each day. This case, like each of
the other four, was decided after considering the class of persons
protected, the nature of their occupations, the effect of such a law,
and making these facts the underlying reason for their decisions.
In none of them was so much left to the discretion of the State
legislature as was left in McClean v. Arkansas.
The importance of the decision under consideration is, there-
fore, patent. In its decision the court acted on a law, the validity
and the results of which have been much questioned. It did not
adopt the reasoning by which like statutes in the State courts
were declared constitutional. The decision indicates that the
states are to be given a broader field to legislate in under the police
power than they have had up to the present time.
It is undeniably true that the legal tendency of the last three
hundred years has been away from police power, and the statutes
of Elizabeth regulating the wages of laborers seem as foreign to
us as the acts of Richard II. declaring that no servant should
play tennis or football. 5 Elizabeth ch. 4 St. 12 Rich. I I. C. 6.
Equally true, however, is the fact that the movement of judicial
decisions during the last quarter century has been toward the ex-
tension of this power. We may, therefore, reiterate with confi-
dence in its truth the opinion voiced twenty years ago by Am-
bassador Bryce in a comment on the Granger cases: "I do not
presume to doubt the correctness of these decisions, but they
evidently present a different view of the sacredness of private
rights, and of the powers of the legislature from that entered
into by Chief Justice Marshall and his contemporaries." Amneri-
can Commonwealth, Vol. 2, p. 167.
THIRD PARTY SUING ON CONTRACT MADE BY ANOTHER.
In the case of Charles Eades v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.,
No. 6262, the Court of the First Instance for the District of
Manila was called upon to determine whether a third party could
sue a promisee on-a contract made with the promisor (primarily
at least) for the promisor's benefit alone. The defendant com-
pany was under contract with the City of Manila to install a
sewerage system. The plaintiff was a fireman employed in the
fire department of the city as a driver. While respondi,,g Zu an
alarm he was thrown from his wagon. He alleges that owing
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to the condition in which the street was left by the contracting
company, he was injured and sued it, with an averment of lia-
bility only such "as arises under and by virtue of such contract."
Decision was rendered for the defendant company based
principally on Art. 1257 of the Civil Code, which reads as
follows: "Contracts shall only be valid between the parties who
execute them and their heirs.* * * Should the contract contain any
stipulation in favor of a third party, he may demand its ful-
filment, provided he has given notice of its acceptance to the
person bound, before it may be revoked ;" following Art. 1165 of
the French (Napoleonic) Code, "Contracts only produce effects
between the contracting parties. They do not affect third par-
ties, and do not benefit them, except in the case provided by Art.
I2I."
This, continues the court, is the law in Germany, Austria,
Italy, Portugal, Holland, Switzerland, and Spanish American
countries, following corresponding provisions in their respective
codes.
Then, perhaps erroneously, the court says that this, too, is the
prevailing. doctrine of the American Law. The law on this sub-
ject both in England and in the United States is an nas been
somewhat anomalous.
In England, originally, a third party could enforce a contract
against a promisor, if it was supported by a valuable considera-
tion, if it was a promise not under seal, and if it was intended for
the benefit of the third person, at least if the third person was a
near relative. Dutton v. Poole, 2 Levin 216; 1 Vent. 318. (Why
relationship was such an important fact seems at first blush dif-
ficult to understand). Later English cases held that under no
circumstances could the third party enforce a contract to Which
he was not a party. Price v. Easton, 4 B. & Adolph. 433.
The weight of modern authority seems to hold that the third
party may recover from the promisor if the promise is upon
consideration, not under seal made primarily for the benefit of
the third party. Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143; Buckley v.
Gray, iio Cal. 339; Lawrence v. Oglesby, 178 Ill., 122. And
it has been so held in at least nineteen states. On this subject
the leading case is Lawrence v. FoX, 20 N. Y. 268. The courts
have, however, shown a tendency not to extend the rule. Mont-
gomnery v. Rief, 15 Utah 495.
The courts which allow the third party to enforce the contract
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against the promisor, do so only when the promise was intended
primarily to benefit him. If the promise was intended for the
promisee's benefit, and the benefit to the third party is merely in-
cidental, in such case the third party cannot maintain an action
against the promisor. Treat v. Stanton, 14 Conn., 445; Crandall
v. Page, 154 Ill., 627. Some courts even go so far as to hold
that the third party can only sue when he is the sole beneficiary.
German S. Bk. v. N. W. Water and L. Co., 1o4 la. 717.
A minority of our courts have held that a contract between
two persons for the benefit of a third person confers no right of
action upon such third person as against the promisor. Morgan
v. The Randolph and Clowes Co., 73 Conn., 396; Williamson v.
McGrath, i8o Mass. 55; Linneman v. Moross Estate, 98 Mich.
178; Coffee v. Shuler, 112 N. C., 622.
The right is one, however, usually recognized in equity. Palm-
er v. Bray, 136 Mich. 85; Zell's Appeal, III Pa. St. 532; O'Con-
nor Adrn'r v. O'Connor, 88 Tenn., 76.
We frankly confess that we see no reason why, in these days
of enlightenment, when such a pronounced tendency exists to
look no longer to the form, but to the substance, we confess we
see no reason why, in any contingency, the third party should not
be entitled to sue on a contract made for his benefit whether
primarily or incidentally; giving a bond against further liability
to the promisor. In the case at bar, however, a strange feature
was present, to wit: A municipal employee suing a third party
for injuries received while he was acting for the municipality on
its governmental side. The circumstances of the suit, however,
were such that it was not necessary for -the court to consider
this question, and it went by entirely unmentioned. H. F.
MOTIVE AS AN ELEMENT OF TORT.
In 19o5 Mr. James Barr Ames, writing on the increasing im-
portance of motive as an element in torts, suggested a case in
which a man should start a shop, not for the sake of profit, but
regardless of loss for the sole purpose of driVing another shop-
keeper out of business and with the intention of retiring upon the
accomplishment of his malevolent purpose. Such a case, he de-
clared, was not likely to arise, but he pointed out that, according to
the trend of many modern decisions, such a defendant would be
held liable. i8 Harvard Law Review, 420.
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On February 19th of this year the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota, acting upon a state of facts aimost identical with those
suggested by Mr. Ames, held the malicious competitor liable in
damages. Tuttle v. Buck, i9 N. W. Rep. 946. The defendant
in the case was a wealthy hanker with much influence in the town
of Howard Lake, Minn. Angered by the plaintiff, who was a
barber, he maliciously established a barber shop, employed a
man to carry on the business and did what he could to draw
away his rival's customers. This was not done for the purpose
of serving any legitimate end of his own, but merely with the
idea of injuring the plaintiff. The business of the plaintiff was
finally ruined as a result.
A perfectly clear question was presented in the case as to
whether underbidding in business done with the sole purpose of
damaging another gives rise to liability. None of the usual inci-
dents of many of the cases involving motive appear. There was
no conspiracy, no inducement to break contracts, and not a sug-
gestion of restraint of trade.
In its decision the court justified itself upon general grounds.
Judge Elliot, rendering the majority opinion, said: "To divert
to one's self the customers of a business rival by the offer of
goods at lower prices is in general a legitimate mode of serving
one's own interest and justifiable as fair competition, but when
a man starts an opposition place of business for the sole purpose
of driving his competitor out of business, he is guilty of a wanton
wrong and an actionable tort. . . . To call such conduct com-
petition is a mere perversion of terms."
On the question of motive as an element in torts -the deci-
sions of the courts differ considerably. It is universally acknowl-
edged that "where one exercises a legal right only, the motive
which actuates him is immaterial." Roycroft v. Taintor, 68 Vt.
219. Certain courts seem to follow this principle almost blindly
in the questions of tort which came before them. Road Co. v-
Douglas, 9 N. Y. 444. National Protective Association v. Cunt-
ming, 17o N. Y. 314-326. The tendency of the modern cases is,
however, to draw a distinction well stated by Mr. Justice Ham-
mond in Plant v. Wqods, 176 Mass. 492: "If the meaning of this.
and other similar expressions is that where a person has a law-
ful right to do a thing irrespective of motive, his motive is im.
material, the proposition is a mere truism. If, however, the mean-
ing is that where a person, if actuated by one kind of motive, has
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a right to do a thing, the act is lawful when done under any con-
ceivable motive, or that an act lawful under one set of cir-
cumstances is therefore lawful under every conceivable set of cir-
cumstances, the proposition does not commend itself to us as
either logically or legally accurate."
This reasoning that certain actions are lawful when done
with one set of motives, but are unlawful when done with another
set, is of ancient origin in the law. The same considerations are
the basis of the decision in Keeble v. Hickeringill, ii East 574 n.,
where the defendant, with the object of urging the plaintiff in
the use of his duck decoy, wilfully fired off guns upon his own
land aifd made loud noises in order to frighten the ducks away
from the plaintiff's land. These were held to be wrongful acts
as they were done with a sinister motive; and yet the defendant
had undoubtedly the privilege of shooting over his own ground,
and if in the bona fide exercise of this right he had made the
same noises at the same time and with the same results in shoot-
ing his own game, he would have been acting within his right to
use as he pleased his own land for his own legitimate purposes.
In the modern case of Harrison v. The Duke of Rutland
[1893], I Q. B. D. 142, the same principle was laid down. It
was here held that to pretend to use a legal privilege as a mere
cloak for doing a wrongful act to the prejudice of another affords
the wrongdoer no greater protection than if that privilege had no
existence. A charge of assault was made against the game-
keepers of the Duke of Rutland, who was the owner of a grouse
moor, crossed by a public highway, the soil of which also belonged
to him. The Duke and a party of friends were shooting when
the defendant, for the sole purpose of interfering with the en-
joyment of the sport, went out upon the highway. In its deci-
sion, the court held the game-keepers justified in preventing the
plaintiff from carrying out his unlawful object upon the ground
that since the plaintiff was on the highway for other purposes
than the use of it as a highway, he was a trespasser.
Two cases, one decided in France, the other in Belgium, well
illustrate the point. In each case an employer threatened to dis-
charge his working men if they traded with the plaintiff. In the
French case the order was held a reasonable regulation, as the
plaintiff, a saloon keeper, had exercised a demoralizing influence
over the employees. Reding v. Kroll, Trib. de Luxembourg
(Oct. 2, 1896) Sirey 1898, 416. Damages were awarded the
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plaintiff in the Belgian case, as the only ground for the order was
that the plaintiff was a political rival of the defendant. Dapsens
v. Lambret Cour d'Appel de Siege (Feb. 9, i888).
The right under which the defendant in the present case claims
is the privilege of competition. That every man has legally cut
prices in order to drive his competitor out of business has be-
come a fixed principle in the law so long ago as the Schoolmaster
Cases, ii Henry IV 47, where one schoolmaster sued another for
injury done by the latter in setting up a rival school, the court
firmly upheld this right of competition. In the Mogul Steamship
Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 593, the House of Lords presented
the doctrine in its modern form and refused to give damages to
the plaintiff for injuries to his business received while in com-
petition with the defendant.
The competition to be privileged must, however, be real. This
distinction was clearly recognized in the Mogul Steamship case.
Lord Esher declared, in his opinion: "An act of competition
otherwise unobjectionable done not for the purpose of competi-
tion, but with intent to injure a rival tradesman or his trade is
not an act done in an ordinary course of trade and, therefore, is
actionable if injury results." Bowers, L. J., also clearly pointed
out the difference between the case under consideration and one
where, under the guise of competition, a purely malicious act is
done which has for its purpose injury to another.
In the United States the courts have laid down no such broad
statement in regard to competition as that of Lord Esher. Where
the few cases involving the subject have arisen the courts have
been conservative in their limitation of competition.
The United States Circuit Court recently decided that one
may advertise and sell the goods of a manufacturer at less than
wholesale price, though the purpose be to inflict a loss on the
manufacturer. The court held that the plaintiff had no remedy
since a person may sell or offer his property at any price he
pleases. Judge Thayer gave the basis of the opinion when he
said: "It is wiser to exclude any inquiry into the motives of men
when their actions are lawful, except in those cases where it is
well established that malice is an essential ingredient of the cause
of action, or in those cases where, the act done being wrongful,
proof of a bad motive will exaggerate damages." Passaic Print
Works v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 105 Fed. 163.
The New York courts favored the same reasoning in National
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Protective Association v. Cumming, 17o N. Y. 314-326. On the
other hand, Massachusetts, in a line of decisions involving the
rights of trades unions, have leaned toward the other point of
view. 18 Harvard Law Review 420. In Wisconsin the legality
of such acts depends on the number of persons concerned. State
v. Huegin, Iio Wis. 189. For a full discussion of the holdings
of the states, see 62 L. R. A. 673.
The attitude taken by the Minnesota Court in Tuttle v. Buck
is therefore a rather radical development of the theory of motive
in competition. In drawing the somewhat fine distinction that
this decision does in making the right of competition depend upon
the motive with which it was done, the court assumes the heavy
burden of ascertaining that fact. As was suggested in the argu-
ment of Aikins v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, such an interpreta-
tion will probably leave much to the whim of the jury. Men do
not,,as a rule, make known their intention under such circum-
stances and the court may do well to remember the comment of
Bryan, C. J., made many centuries ago: "For it is trit6 learning
that the thought of a man is not triable, for the devil himself
knows not the thought of a man." Year Book, 17 Ed. IV i.
